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As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit
Pie? The Conservative Campaign





1 The 2019 general election took place in a divided country in which tension and distrust
in  politicians  had  been  exacerbated  by  months,  even  years,  of  Brexit  uncertainty.
Clarity was desperately needed as the political class had failed to deliver any solution to
the Brexit  problem. Putting the decision back to the people seemed to be the only
viable way out. The 2019 general election was then seen as extremely important. It was
even  dubbed  “a  once-in-a-lifetime  election”  that  would  “decide  the  future  of  our
country  for  generations”1.  However,  because  of  the  current  political  chaos,  it  also
became one the most unpredictable elections in recent history. Would it be a Brexit
election, as most commentators predicted? Or maybe a social election, with a real focus
on the NHS? Some even claimed that it would be “the climate election”2.
2 In the end, it turned out to be mainly about Brexit and the early uncertainty was wiped
out  as  the  Conservatives  won  by  a  landslide.  They  even  managed  to  win  seats  in
traditional Labour strongholds. Many factors have been used to explain this sweeping
victory: Brexit fatigue, a charismatic leader and an opposition in disarray. All of this
was encapsulated in a highly efficient Conservative campaign.
3 This clear mandate for the Tories was not a given as the previous general election, back
in 2017, had resulted in a fiasco: the party lost its majority and had to rely on the DUP’s
ten MPs3. The Conservative campaign was heavily criticized for blowing up what should
have  been  an  easy  win4.  A  new  approach  was  therefore  needed,  a  necessity  Boris
Johnson’s campaign team understood perfectly. But they did not carry out a clear and
comprehensive  overhaul  of  the  Conservative  strategy.  Quite  ironically,  they  sought
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inspiration in what political strategist Lynton Crosby had suggested they do back in
2017:
Be clear why this election is needed. Frame it as a choice between stability and
uncertainty. Demonstrate to the country that the only way to secure that stability is
with a solid and united party. Convince the public that this party is the Tories. And,
finally, take every opportunity to contrast with Corbyn5.
4 As Tom McTague puts it, they fought the 2019 election with 2017 scripts6. However, if
the script was quite similar, the Conservatives had learned the lessons from the 2017
disaster and devised a more efficient strategy.
5 First, they would use a very simple message, “Get Brexit done”, and replace Theresa
May’s  focus  on  change  with  an  emphasis  on  stability  and  practical  conservatism.
Second,  they  adopted  a  populist  approach and focused  on  a  popular  leader.  Prime
Minister  (PM)  Boris  Johnson  proved  to  be  both  a  liability  and  an  asset  as  his
unpredictability  would sometimes hinder  his  charismatic  appeal.  Third,  they would
gather a very efficient campaign team as controlling Johnson’s character and making
the most of it became a real challenge.
6 The campaign team surrounding Boris Johnson comprised several advisors who had
worked  for  Johnson  for  quite  some  time.  Lee  Cain  is  the  PM's  director  of
communication  and  was  Mr  Johnson's special  adviser  as  foreign  secretary.  He  was
mainly concerned with managing the PM's media appearances and messaging during
the  campaign.  Other  members  had  worked  with  Johnson  during  the  Vote  Leave
campaign in 2016. Rob Oxley, for example, was a close aide to Johnson and is now the
PM's press secretary. The most notorious spin doctor is Dominic Cummings, the PM's
de facto chief of staff. He played a big role during the campaign, but in the background
as  the  official  director  of  politics  and  campaign  at  Conservative  headquarters  was
Australian political strategist Isaac Levido7, who was instrumental in the unexpected
election of Australian PM Scott Morrison. As Dominic Cummings deferred to the young
Australian  (35  years  old)  on  campaign matters,  Levido  brought  together  a  team of
young talents  and displayed the  clarity  and discipline  that  the  2017  campaign had
lacked.
7 This paper will be organized according to this threefold strategy: a populist message (I)
was delivered by a charismatic yet unpredictable leader (II) who was backed by a team
of young strategists ready to bend the rules, in particular online (III).
 
A political incantation: ‘Get Brexit Done’
8 The importance and the impact of a political slogan should never be downplayed. For
example,  Dominic  Cummings’s  brainchild “Vote leave,  take back control”,  is  widely
credited with the eventual success of the official  campaign in favour of leaving the
European  Union  (EU)  during  the  Brexit  referendum,  Vote  Leave8.  According  to
Professor Tim Haughton “it helped to mobilize the anti-establishment support of voters who
felt let down by their politicians”9.
9 The notion of mobilization is essential here10. The origin of the word slogan is "from the
Gaelic 'sluagh-ghairm' meaning a clan's battle-cry”11. It brings people together before
an important event and is one of the first elements that a campaign team needs to find.
A good slogan, in the words of Florian Silnicki, a communication expert and founder of
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LaFrenchCom’, needs to be “short, straightforward and accessible” as its emotional appeal
represents a key asset in political communication12. 
10 According to David Gagnon, a slogan is the “ultimate synthesis of the program of a party
during  the  election  campaign”13.  But  a  political  slogan  will  also  “prevent  people  from
thinking” as Olivier Reboul put it14. A political slogan therefore shares similarities with
metaphors in this hiding/ highlighting phenomenon: it brings some elements to the
forefront while sidelining others15. For that matter, the 2019 Conservative slogan was a
case in point. 
11 The  three  simple  words  “Get  Brexit  done”  showed  that  the  key  policy  of  the
Conservatives was to focus on Brexit so as to draw a line under it and move on to other
issues. Its simplicity reinforced its appeal as Tim Bale, a professor of politics at Queen
Mary, University of London, remarked : “slogan obviously played a part in Johnson’s victory
[…] partly because it appealed to leavers but also because it appealed to some remainers who are
sick to the back teeth of Brexit and want to get it over with”16.
12 The origin of the slogan might explain its success as “the effectiveness [of a slogan]
depends on acceptance and use by the public”17. As the Conservatives had organized a
focus group in the Northern town of Bury, the idea of the “Get Brexit Done” slogan
emerged from a conversation of  half  a  dozen Tory supporters,  as  one Conservative
strategist recalled:
“Voters were chatting about Brexit and there was a [group] of about four to five
people who started talking about ‘getting it done’ […] that was all they wanted: to
get Brexit out of the way, out of their lives. ‘Get Brexit Done’ emerged from that
meeting.  It  was  trailed  at  the  party  conference  and  went  on  to  define  the
campaign.”18
13 Thus, the leading principle of the Tory campaign, encapsulated in the slogan, comes
from  the  people.  This  bottom-up  approach  seems  to  run  counter  the  ideologically
driven campaign of Labour. The Conservatives can therefore describe themselves as
being close  to  the people  and as  literally  caring about  what  the man in  the street
thinks. 
14 “Get  Brexit  Done”  entails  an  inherent  opposition  between  the  government  and
Parliament. The 2019 election can be seen as the climax of a showdown between a Tory
government, led first by Theresa May and then Boris Johnson, which asserted that the
2016 referendum result was a clear enough mandate to implement their own idea of
Brexit and the British Parliament whose members voted in majority against Brexit19.
Throughout the three years leading up to Brexit, the government tried several times to
bypass Parliament. It even prorogued it only to be ruled out by the Supreme Court. On
the other hand, Parliament managed to have a say in the Brexit process, in particular
by imposing a so-called “meaningful vote” at the end of the negotiations between the
government and the EU. 
15 By  focusing  on  “getting  Brexit  done”,  the  Conservatives  clearly  signalled  that  a
landslide victory would give them carte blanche to implement the will of the people. As
Boris Johnson’s main backdrop on the day of the result, which bore the words “the
people’s  government”,  the  government  would  be  answerable  only  to  the  people,
effectively  creating an opposition between the people  and Parliament.  Westminster
would therefore be here exclusively to enforce the will  of  the government,  making
Parliament irrelevant and meaningless. 
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16 Using  Edmund  Burke’s  distinction,  Agnès  Alexandre-Collier  rightly  points  out  that
members of Parliament are transformed from trustees to delegates20.  They are only
here to implement the direct will of the people, not to act in all conscience for the
greater good of the nation. As the slogan makes clear, the government would get its
legitimacy through its popular support, not through Parliament. The link between the
leader and the people is therefore direct, which is one essential aspect of populism21.
17 This populist approach might not be in the long-term interest of the Conservative Party
itself. As Andy Knott, from the University of Brighton, puts it “populism is incompatible
with  some  of  the  central  principles  of  British  conservatism”.  The  Conservatives  cherish
British traditions and institutions, in particular Parliament, and they revere the rule of
law. Populism, on the other hand, does not lay the emphasis on the law and considers
political mediators such as parliaments as a danger to the relationship between the
people  and  the  leader.  The  2019  populist  approach  might  therefore  have  serious
consequences on the future of the Conservative Party which might have to manage “the
fallout for decades to come” 22.
18 To sum up, the “Get Brexit Done” slogan shows that the Conservatives are interested in
the here and now, in delivering Brexit, “do or die”, to paraphrase Johnson. This short-
term  approach  was  nonetheless  counterbalanced  by  the  phrase  “Unleash  Britain’s
potential”, which was added to the title of the manifesto. This was a clear reference to
the rhetoric used by the Vote Leave campaign during the 2016 referendum according to
which Britain was seen as being imprisoned in Europe23. Michael Gove went as far as
saying:
I want us to vote to Leave the EU before it’s too late, because that’s the safer choice
for Britain.  If  we vote to stay,  we’re not settling for a secure status quo.  We’re
voting to be hostages locked in the back of the car and driven headlong towards
deeper EU integration24.
19 This reference to the successful 2016 campaign enabled the Conservatives to display
continuity  and  to  reinforce  Boris  Johnson’s  Brexit  credentials.  The  incumbent  PM
would indeed be a major player in the campaign.
 
Controlling Bojo’s mojo
20 The  Conservative  Party  has  always  considered  itself  as  the  “natural  party  of
government”25.  This  political  dominance  rests  on  two  key  elements:  strong  party
discipline and a powerful and unifying leader who commands personal loyalty26. The
Brexit  crisis,  and  the  way  it  was  handled  by  the  Tories,  seems  to  challenge  this
traditional conception. Theresa May was at the head of a divided party whose MPs did
not hesitate to defy the official party policy and voted down her Brexit deal. Theresa
May herself was no unifying figure. During her disastrous 2017 campaign, her official
slogan “Strong and Stable Leadership” was soon derided into “weak and wobbly”27.
21 Boris Johnson’s campaign team would make sure their candidate would not make the
same  mistake  and  would  go  back  to  what  made  the  Tories  so  politically  efficient:
discipline  and  loyalty  to  the  leader.  Dominic  Cummings  is  believed  to  have
masterminded the groundwork. He is credited with controversial decisions before the
election,  such as  the prorogation of  Parliament or  the suspension of  21  rebel  MPs,
including Winston Churchill's grandson. What has been dubbed as “purge” by some
seems to have paid off:
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Johnson returns to No. 10 Downing Street having cleared the House of Commons of
many of its anti-Brexit protagonists and supported by a fresh crop of obedient Tory
MPs who have signed up to his Brexit vision28.
22 This brutal approach proved to be quite efficient and for many in the PM’s team, the
2019 general election was won even before the campaign began29. As the political field
had been cleared out, Johnson was now able to make the most of the situation. His self-
centred populist approach seems to have hit home for two main reasons. 
23 First,  because of  the way the Conservative leader is  chosen.  Following a process  of
democratisation in 1998, it is the membership of the party, not the MPs, who have the
final  word,  through  a  postal  ballot.  This  had  important  consequences  on  the  very
organisation and official policy of the party:
This reform clearly changed the balance of power in the party by making the leader
more sensitive to the grassroots’ needs and wishes and therefore more vulnerable
to them, thus exposing the whole party to the risk of populism […] Based on the
assumption  that  these  grassroots  are  more  Eurosceptic,  Euroscepticism,  as  a
consequence, has come to permeate the whole party structure, from bottom to top,
with party leaders and MPs responding, in return, to this grassroots’ pressure30.
24 Johnson’s populism is therefore in tune with the evolution of the party. On top of that,
and  this  will  be  the  second reason  for  Johnson’s  successful  populist  approach,  the
Brexit crisis is seen as so complicated that voters tend to rely on personalities rather
than political ideas. This had already been the case in 2015 when Cameron went back to
Downing Street and it is fair to assume that Brexit has reinforced this tendency31:
Some  71%  of  Tory  voters  cited  the  leader  as  one  of  the  three  most  important
reasons for voting for the party […] [This] is consistent with the possibility that
more and more voters are coming to rely on leadership evaluations as a heuristic
simplification to guide their decision at a time when policy debates are becoming
increasingly complex and almost impossible for non-experts to adjudicate on32.
25 As Boris Johnson has been a household name for decades33, his populist approach was
therefore  very  likely  to  work  well.  Focusing  on  Johnson’s  personality  was  both  an
asset34 and a liability. His unpredictability, just like his personal problems, posed a risk
to the campaign. He and his team had to face off a smear campaign over allegations of
conflict of interest and sexual misconduct with a former friend of his, Jennifer Arcuri.
But because no politician was immune from defamation, his advisers did not worry too
much. 
26 Foreign interference proved to be more harmful as Johnson refused to release a report
on Russian interference into British politics before the election. Russia was even alleged
to have leaked documents later used by Labour revealing that the Conservatives would
put the NHS “on the table” in US trade talks35. Concerning the US, Johnson’s personal
friendship with Donald Trump was also a problem. In an interview with Nigel Farage,
Trump praised Johnson while claiming that “we can’t make a trade deal with the UK”36.
Johnson’s team made sure he would not hold one-to-one conversation with Trump at
the 2019 NATO summit in London. They only met once, discreetly, at Downing Street. 
27 The solution found by the campaign team to avoid trouble was to control, and limit,
Johnson’s public appearance as much as possible37. This approach was vindicated when
several unplanned events went wrong: certain videos went viral and could have had a
damaging effect on the Conservative campaign. When presented with the picture of a
young  boy  lying  on  the  floor  of  an  overcrowded  hospital  by  a  journalist,  Johnson
refused to look at it and took the journalist’s phone away. Similarly, when confronted
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by Good Morning Britain journalists for an impromptu interview, Johnson, who was in
the middle of a publicity stunt delivering milk to regular people, decided to hide in a
walk-in fridge nearby. Worse, one of his closest aides, Rob Oxley swore when he saw the
ITV journalists. 
28 In order to avoid getting more bad press, the campaign team tried to control Johnson’s
public appearance carefully to drive home the message encapsulated in the “Get Brexit
Done” slogan. To achieve this, they would capitalise on Johnson’s charisma and easy-
going  appearance. To  symbolise  the  fact  that  he  would  literally  break  the  Brexit
deadlock, he was photographed wearing boxing gloves emblazoned with “Get Brexit
Done” in Manchester. He made his point even more explicit later in the campaign when
he drove a digger with "Get Brexit Done" written on its bucket through a polystyrene
wall emblazoned with the word "Gridlock".
29 More in tune with Johnson’s traditional humorous self, he parodied the 2003 romcom
Love Actually into “Vote Conservative Actually”. In the three-minute video, Johnson
attacks Parliament by blaming it for the current chaotic situation: “with any luck, by
next year, Brexit will be ‘done’, if  Parliament doesn't block it again”. By addressing
people  directly  (he  knocks  on  somebody’s  door  and  silently  shows  his  message  on
boards) he reinforced the government of the people versus Parliament approach that
we discussed in Part I. But this kind of stunt was only the tip of the iceberg and his
campaign team went much further online. 
 
Unleashing hell online: the digital campaign
30 Back in 2017, Labour made the most of the digital campaign by encouraging grassroots
activism through a “new politics” approach. As Emma Bell put it, digital campaigning
was done “in a horizontal manner which allowed people to actively get involved in a
political movement”38. With organisations such as Red Labour and Momentum, Labour
gained ascendency over a weak Conservative campaign. In 2019, the Tories would take
the influence of the digital campaign more seriously. 
31 The campaign online was handled by two New Zealanders in their 20s, Sean Topham
and Ben Guerin, at the head of a ten-strong team. Before joining the conservative team,
Topham and Guerin had worked on a series of controversial campaigns, in particular
when they were employed by Sir Lynton Crosby39. They also played an important role in
the victorious campaign of Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in 2019. 
32 Despite growing concerns over transparency and calls for more regulation on digital
campaigning, the pair managed to outgun Labour and to turn social networking sites
into major battlegrounds. In addition to the short videos discussed in part II (the Brexit
wall and the Love Actually parody) the 2019 Conservative campaign online was three-
fold: they would use so-called “shit-posting”, blatant dirty tricks and countless ads. 
33 In the same way as Vote Leave managed to convince people to leave the EU, the digital
campaign would focus on emotions. The “Meme machine”, as the two men came to be
dubbed,  wanted  to  “unlock  arousal  emotions… anger,  excitement,  pride,  fear”40,  as
Cummings had done a few years before. 
34 To do so,  they used so-called “shit-posting”,  that  is  “the act  of  throwing out  huge
amounts of content, most of it ironic, low-quality trolling, for the purpose of provoking
an emotional reaction in less Internet-savvy viewers”41. In the same vein, they would
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flood social media with “boomer memes” which are “hastily executed and comically
dubious pairings of image and text pitched to older voters”42. The most famous example
was a picture of Jeremy Corbyn’s head Photoshopped onto a man in a chicken costume.
35 Those “boomer memes” were designed to be simple, straightforward and amusing. That
way, they managed to reach out to older voters, who are usually not as concerned as
younger ones with social  media.  Those memes were absurd and poor in quality  on
purpose: the more people derided them, the more publicity they got. This was all part
of a plan as one anonymous source said: “we’d make them really basic and deliberately lame
because  they’d  get  shares  and  lift  our  reach;  that  made  our  reach  for  the  harder  political
messages  higher”43.  Along  with  those  absurd  creations,  the  digital  campaign  also
resorted to dirty tricks. 
36 The bulk  of  the  online  activities  were  attacks  on Labour.  This  was  facilitated  by  a
partisan  press  that  displayed  much  hostility  towards  Labour.  Researchers  at
Loughborough University even found that “press hostility to Labour was more than
double the levels identified during the 2017 election”44. The campaign online backed
statements by Johnson comparing Corbyn to Stalin and did not hesitate to bend the
rules to bring their message home. Two examples, among others: a fake factchecking
website and a mock Labour website. 
37 During the TV debate between Johnson and Corbyn, the Conservatives rebranded their
official  Twitter  account  as  “factcheckUK”  to  make  it  look  like  an  impartial  fact-
checking  service.  The  account  pretended  that  Johnson’s  statements  were  “facts”,
pushed  pro-Conservative  material  and  eventually  declare  Johnson  winner  of  the
debate. The stunt caused an outcry45 . But the deed was done. 
38 The digital team also created a fake Labour website supposed to analyse the content of
the  Labour  manifesto.  Here  again,  the  URL  was  meant  to  cause  confusion  as
“Labourmanifesto.co.uk” made it look official. But they did not stop there, according to
the Guardian: “The Conservatives had apparently paid for a Google advert which meant
internet browsers were directed to the website when they searched for ‘Labour’”46.
39 Last but not least, the Conservatives flooded Facebook with thousands of “misleading”
adverts. As Facebook took the decision in October to refuse to ban political ads and to
fact-check them, the Conservatives made the most of it. According to journalist Simon
Chandler “88% of the Facebook ads the Conservatives posted in the first four days of
December were deemed misleading by Full Fact, one of the U.K.’s biggest fact-checking
organisations”47. Matt Walsh, a Senior Lecturer at Cardiff University, explains that “this
is  part  of  a  deliberate strategy to create noise on social  media,  to  encourage users  to  share
content in anger or outrage, fuelling its viral reach”48. It seems therefore that the “Meme
Machine”, following in Dominic Cummings’s footsteps, took digital campaign to a whole
other level, taking full advantage of loose – or non-existent – regulation online. 
 
Conclusion
40 The 2019 conservative campaign was built around one simple idea: delivering Brexit. In
a context of political fatigue, promising to finally move on seems to have hit home with
most  voters.  The  Conservatives  also  benefited  from  a  poorly  organised  Labour
opposition that was embroiled in internal struggle and marred by anti-Semitism. Other
parties  also  failed  to  provide  a  clear  alternative  to  Johnson’s  compelling  message.
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However, his populist triumph might be only a short-term victory as it raised questions
concerning the future and the long-term survival of the Conservative Party. 
41 Alma-Pierre Bonnet est professeur agrégé de civilisation britannique à Sciences
Po Lyon. Après avoir soutenu une thèse en civilisation britannique sur une étude
comparative des discours de guerre de David Lloyd George et Winston Churchill, il
est actuellement PRAG d’anglais, spécialisé en civilisation et politique britannique
à l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon (Sciences Po Lyon). Il est particulièrement
intéressé  par  la  politique  britannique  contemporaine  et  ses  recherches  se
concentrent sur la stratégie et la communication politique.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
‘EU vote: Where the cabinet and other MPs stand’, BBC news, 22 June 2016 https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35616946 27 February 2020.
‘Press hostility to Labour reaches new levels in 2019 election campaign’ https://
www.lboro.ac.uk/news-events/news/2019/december/press-hostility-to-labour-reaches-new-
levels/ Consulted 3 March 2020.
Alexandre-Collier, Agnès, Avril, Emmanuelle, Les partis politiques en Grande-Bretagne, (Paris,
Armand Colin, 2013 - 288 pages).
Alexandre Collier, Agnès, ‘Le nouveau populisme des Tories’, 29 October 2019, The Conversation,
https://theconversation.com/le-nouveau-populisme-des-tories-125740 consulted 27 February
2020.
Alexandre-Collier, Agnès, « Euroscepticism under Margaret Thatcher and David Cameron: From
Theory to Practice », Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 17 | 2015, mis en ligne le 01
mai 2016, consulté le 28 février 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/1778 ; DOI :
https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.1778
Bale, Tim and Webb, Paul, « The Conservatives: their Sweetest Victory? », Revue Française de
Civilisation Britannique [Online], XX-3 | 2015, Online since 01 December 2015, connection on 28
February 2020. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/480; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/
rfcb.480. 
Beckett, Andy, ‘How the Tory election machine fell apart’, The Guardian, 26 June 2017 https://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/26/tory-election-machine-fell-apart-negative-tactics
consulted 25 February 2020.
Bell, Emma, ‘The 2017 Labour General Election Campaign: Ushering in a ‘New Politics’?’, Revue
Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018, Online since 14 September 2018,
connection on 02 March 2020. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/2029; DOI: https://
doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.2029.
Perrigo, Billy, ‘'Get Brexit Done.' The 3 Words That Helped Boris Johnson Win Britain's 2019
Election’, Time, 13 December 2019 https://time.com/5749478/get-brexit-done-slogan-uk-
election/ consulted 27 February 2020.
As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit Pie? The Conservative Campaign
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-3 | 2020
8
Bonnet, Alma-Pierre, « Brexit and the myth of grandeur », Metaphor and Manipulation,
International conference, Lyon, 17 May 2019 to be published in ELAD-SILDA : Études de Linguistique
et d’Analyse des Discours – Studies in Linguistics and Discourse.
Bonnet, Alma-Pierre, ‘Coming out of the fridge’, International conference, IEP Lyon, 24 April
2020.
Chandler, Simon, ‘Thousands Of Misleading Facebook Ads Help Conservatives To ‘Crushing’ U.K.
Election Victory’, Forbes, 14 December 2019 https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/
2019/12/14/thousands-of-misleading-facebook-ads-help-conservatives-to-crushing-uk-election-
victory/ consulted 3 March 2020.
Dickson, Annabelle and others, ‘We’re all living in Dominic Cummings’ world now’, Politico, 13
December 2019 https://www.politico.eu/article/dominic-cummings-uk-electio-2019-strategy-
conservative-victory/ consulted 28 February 2020.
Gagnon, David, (2009). ‘Un slogan, et tout devient possible’. Québec français, (153), 58–60.
Hare, Geoffrey, ‘Studying political slogans as communication.’ Francophonie: The French Journal of
the Association for Language Learning 3 (June 1991): 24.
Haughton, Tim, ‘It's the slogan, stupid: The Brexit Referendum’, Birmingham University, https://
www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/eu-ref-haughton.aspx consulted 27 February
2020.
Heppell, Timothy, The Tories, from Winston Churchill to David Cameron, (London, Bloomsbury, 2014,
205 pages).
Herbert, Barry III, Politically Speaking, ed. Ofer Feldman and Christ'l De Landtsheer (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 1998) 161.
Hinde, Simon, “Brexit and the media”, C.N.R.S. Editions | Hermès, La Revue. 
Jamet, Denis et Terry, Adeline, « Principes et fonctions de la métaphore en langue de spécialité
dans un cadre cognitiviste », ELAD-SILDA [En ligne], n° La métaphore dans les discours de
spécialité, publié le : 08/10/2019, URL : http://publications-prairial.fr/elad-silda/index.php?
id=412.
Kavanagh, Dennis, « Brexit, the Conservatives and the General Election 2017 », Revue Française de
Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018, Online since 14 September 2018, connection on 25
February 2020. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/2085; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/
rfcb.2085
Knott, Andy, ‘Boris Johnson’s flirtation with populism will have lasting consequences for the
Conservative Party’, The Conversation, 1 October 2019 https://theconversation.com/boris-
johnsons-flirtation-with-populism-will-have-lasting-consequences-for-the-conservative-
party-124360 consulted 27 February 2020.
LaFrenchCom, 26 avril 2016 https://www.lafrenchcom.fr/actualites/slogans-politiques-
communication-souvent-maladroite/ consulted 27 February 2020.
Maguire, Patrick and Grylls, George, ‘Isaac Levido and the Meme Machine’, Newstatesman, 4
December 2019 https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/election-2019/2019/12/isaac-levido-
and-meme-machine consulted 4 March 2020.
Mason, Rowena, ‘Trump says Johnson's Brexit could rule out US trade deal’, The Guardian, 1
November 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/31/trump-says-johnson-and-
farage-could-form-unstoppable-force consulted 2 March 2020.
As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit Pie? The Conservative Campaign
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-3 | 2020
9
McTague, Tom, ‘Boris Johnson Bets on a Strategy Theresa May Ignored’, The Atlantic, 29
November 2019 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/11/britain-election-
conservatives-labour-2017/602737/ consulted 25 February 2020.
Miller, Harry, ‘Dominic Cummings has ‘done’ Brexit. Now he plans to reinvent politics’, Financial
Times, 16 January 2020 https://www.ft.com/content/0bf8a910-372e-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4
consulted 27 February 2020.
Morrison, Sean, ‘Key players in Boris Johnson's election campaign: From Dominic Cummings to
Isaac Levido and Lee Cain’, Evening Standard, 13 December 2019 https://www.standard.co.uk/
news/politics/boris-johnson-election-campaign-key-players-a4312441.html consulted 26
February 2020.
Murphy, Simon, Tories set up 'Labour manifesto' website to attack Corbyn's plans’, The Guardian,
21 November 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/21/tory-party-tweets-link-
to-fake-labour-manifesto-site consulted 3 March 2020.
Nianxi, Xia, « logique et slogans en politique », Presses Universitaires de France | Diogène 2008/1
n° 221 | pages 146 à 155.
Payne, Sebastian, ‘UK election: how the Tories ‘got it done’’, Financial Times, 22 December 2019
https://www.ft.com/content/ab3692b0-2317-11ea-92da-f0c92e957a96 consulted 27 February
2020.
Rawlinson, Kevin, ‘Russia involved in leak of papers saying NHS is for sale, says Reddit’, The
Guardian, 7 December 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/07/russia-
involved-in-leak-of-papers-saying-nhs-is-for-sale-says-reddit#_=_ consulted 2 March 2020.
Ridge-Newman, Anthony, ‘Weak and wobbly’ to ‘get Brexit done’: 2019 and Conservative
campaigns’, Election analysis, http://www.electionanalysis.uk/uk-election-analysis-2019/
section-4-parties-and-the-campaign/weak-and-wobbly-to-get-brexit-done-2019-and-
conservative-campaigns/ consulted 28 February 2020.
Ross, Tim and Tom, McTague, Betting the House: The Inside Story of the 2017 Election (London,
Biteback Publishing, 2017) p. 431.
Sabine Michelon, « The Stage-Management of the leaders’ personal lives in the 2015 General
Election », Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XX-3 | 2015, Online since 01
December 2015, connection on 02 March 2020. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/515;
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.515.
Shukman, David, ‘General election 2019: How big an issue is climate change for voters?’ BBC News,
6 November 2019 https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-50307304 consulted 25
February 2020.
Southern, Rosalynd, Election analysis, http://www.electionanalysis.uk/uk-election-analysis-2019/
section-6-the-digital-campaign/big-chickens-dumbfakes-squirrel-killers-was-2019-the-election-
where-shitposing-went-mainstream/ consulted 2 March 2020.
The Conversation, ‘UK election 2019: conspiracy or cock-up? The digital dirty tricks marring this
campaign’ 28 November 2019 https://theconversation.com/uk-election-2019-conspiracy-or-
cock-up-the-digital-dirty-tricks-marring-this-campaign-127847 consulted 3 March 2020.
Vote Leave, 19 April 2016 http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/
michael_gove_s_oped_for_bbc_radio_4_today_programme.html consulted 27 February 2020.
As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit Pie? The Conservative Campaign
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-3 | 2020
10
Waterson, Jim, ‘Tories hire Facebook propaganda pair to run online election campaign’, The
Guardian, 23 October 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/23/tories-hire-
facebook-propaganda-pair-to-run-online-election-campaign consulted 2 March 2020.
Waterson, Jim, ‘Tories pretend to be factchecking service during leaders' debate’, The Guardian, 19
November 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/19/tories-tweet-anti-labour-
posts-under-factcheckuk-brand consulted 3 March 2020.
White, Jonathan, ‘Everyone says this is a once-in-a-lifetime election. Is that why it’s been so
dirty?’ The Guardian, 10 December 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/
dec/10/once-lifetime-election-dirty-democracy consulted 25 February 2020.
YouGov, Does Britain understand Brexit? https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/
2019/01/11/does-britain-understand-brexit consulted 28 February 2020.
NOTES
1. Jonathan White, ‘Everyone says this is a once-in-a-lifetime election. Is that why it’s been so
dirty?’
The  Guardian,  10  December  2019  https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/10/
once-lifetime-election-dirty-democracy consulted 25 February 2020.
2. David Shukman, ‘General election 2019: How big an issue is climate change for voters?’ BBC
News, 6 November 2019 https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-50307304 consulted 25
February 2020.
3. Dennis Kavanagh, « Brexit, the Conservatives and the General Election 2017 », Revue Française
de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018, Online since 14 September 2018, connection on
25 February 2020. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/2085; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/
rfcb.2085 
4. Andy Beckett, ‘How the Tory election machine fell apart’, The Guardian, 26 June 2017 https://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/26/tory-election-machine-fell-apart-negative-tactics
consulted 25 February 2020.
5. Ross, Tim and Tom, McTague, Betting the House: The Inside Story of the 2017 Election (London,
Biteback Publishing, 2017) p. 431.
6. Tom  McTague,  ‘Boris  Johnson  Bets  on  a  Strategy  Theresa  May  Ignored’,  The  Atlantic,  29
November  2019  https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/11/britain-election-
conservatives-labour-2017/602737/ consulted 25 February 2020. 
7. Sean Morrison, ‘Key players in Boris Johnson's election campaign: From Dominic Cummings to
Isaac  Levido and Lee  Cain’,  Evening  Standard,  13  December 2019 https://www.standard.co.uk/
news/politics/boris-johnson-election-campaign-key-players-a4312441.html  consulted  26
February 2020.
8. Harry  Miller,  ‘Dominic  Cummings  has  ‘done’  Brexit.  Now  he  plans  to  reinvent  politics’,
Financial  Times,  16  January  2020  https://www.ft.com/content/0bf8a910-372e-11ea-
a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 consulted 27 February 2020.
9. Tim  Haughton,  ‘It's  the  slogan,  stupid:  The  Brexit  Referendum’  https://
www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/eu-ref-haughton.aspx  consulted  27  February
2020.
10. Xia Nianxi, « logique et slogans en politique », Presses Universitaires de France | « Diogène »
2008/1 n° 221 | pages 146 à 155.
11. Geoffrey, Hare,  "Studying political  slogans as communication." Francophonie:  The French
Journal of the Association for Language Learning 3 (June 1991): 24.
As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit Pie? The Conservative Campaign
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-3 | 2020
11
12. LaFrenchCom,  26  avril  2016  https://www.lafrenchcom.fr/actualites/slogans-politiques-
communication-souvent-maladroite/ consulted 27 February 2020.
13. « Le slogan politique se veut la synthèse absolue du programme d'un parti au moment précis
de la campagne électorale » David, Gagnon, (2009). Un slogan, et tout devient possible. Québec
français, (153), 58–60.
14. Olivier, Reboul, (1975), Le slogan, (Paris, Complexe, p. 11).
15. Denis Jamet et Adeline Terry, «Principes et fonctions de la métaphore en langue de spécialité
dans  un  cadre  cognitiviste»,  ELAD-SILDA [En  ligne],  n°  La  métaphore  dans  les  discours  de
spécialité,  publié  le  :  08/10/2019,  URL  :  http://publications-prairial.fr/elad-silda/index.php?
id=412.
16. Billy Perrigo, ‘'Get Brexit Done.' The 3 Words That Helped Boris Johnson Win Britain's 2019
Election’,  Time,  13  December  2019  https://time.com/5749478/get-brexit-done-slogan-uk-
election/ consulted 27 February 2020.
17. Herbert, Barry III, Politically Speaking, ed. Ofer Feldman and Christ'l De Landtsheer (Westport,
CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998) 161.
18. Sebastian Payne, ‘UK election: how the Tories ‘got it done’’, Financial Times, 22 December 2019
https://www.ft.com/content/ab3692b0-2317-11ea-92da-f0c92e957a96  consulted  27  February
2020.
19. More than 65% of MPs declared they would vote to remain. Source: ‘EU vote:  Where the
cabinet and other MPs stand’, BBC news, 22 June 2016 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-
referendum-35616946 27 February 2020.
20. Agnès Alexandre Collier, ‘Le nouveau populisme des Tories’, The Conversation, 29 October 2019
https://theconversation.com/le-nouveau-populisme-des-tories-125740  consulted  27  February
2020. 
21. Encyclopædia Britannica https://www.britannica.com/topic/populism consulted 27 February
2020.
22. Andy Knott, ‘Boris Johnson’s flirtation with populism will have lasting consequences for the
Conservative  Party’,  The  Conversation,  1  October  2019  https://theconversation.com/boris-
johnsons-flirtation-with-populism-will-have-lasting-consequences-for-the-conservative-
party-124360 consulted 27 February 2020.
23. Alma-Pierre,  Bonnet,  « Brexit  and  the  myth  of  grandeur »,  Metaphor  and  Manipulation,
International conference, Lyon, 17 May 2019 to be published in ELAD-SILDA: Études de
Linguistique et d’Analyse des Discours – Studies in Linguistics and Discourse. 
24. Vote Leave, 19 April 2016 
http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/
michael_gove_s_oped_for_bbc_radio_4_today_programme.html consulted 27 February 2020.
25. Agnès, Alexandre-Collier,  Emmanuelle, Avril,  Les partis  politiques en Grande-Bretagne,  (Paris,
Armand Colin, 2013 - 288 pages).
26. Timothy, Heppell, The Tories, from Winston Churchill to David Cameron, (London, Bloomsbury,
2014, 205 pages).
27. Anthony Ridge-Newman,  ‘Weak  and wobbly’  to  ‘get  Brexit  done’:  2019  and Conservative
campaigns’,  Election  analysis http://www.electionanalysis.uk/uk-election-analysis-2019/
section-4-parties-and-the-campaign/weak-and-wobbly-to-get-brexit-done-2019-and-
conservative-campaigns/ consulted 28 February 2020.
28. Annabelle Dickson and others, ‘We’re all living in Dominic Cummings’ world now’, Politico, 13
December  2019  https://www.politico.eu/article/dominic-cummings-uk-electio-2019-strategy-
conservative-victory/ consulted 28 February 2020.
29. Ibid, Financial Times, 22 December 2019 
30. Agnès Alexandre-Collier, « Euroscepticism under Margaret Thatcher and David Cameron :
From Theory to Practice », Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 17 | 2015, mis en ligne le
As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit Pie? The Conservative Campaign
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-3 | 2020
12
01 mai 2016, consulté le 28 février 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/1778 ; DOI :
https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.1778 
31. YouGov,  Does  Britain  understand  Brexit?  https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-
reports/2019/01/11/does-britain-understand-brexit consulted 28 February 2020.
32. Tim Bale and Paul Webb, « The Conservatives: their Sweetest Victory? », Revue Française de
Civilisation Britannique [Online], XX-3 |  2015, Online since 01 December 2015, connection on 28
February  2020.  URL:  http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/480;  DOI:  https://doi.org/10.4000/
rfcb.480. 
33. In addition to his two mandate as London mayor, Johnson often appeared on TV and he has
also  extensively  written  on  the  European  Union,  as  a  Brussels  correspondent  for  the  Daily
Telegraph in the 90s, very often attacking the EU and coining popular “Euromyths”. Source: 
Simon Hinde, Brexit and the media, C.N.R.S. Editions | « Hermès, La Revue ». 
34. Sabine Michelon, « The Stage-Management of the leaders’ personal lives in the 2015 General
Election  »,  Revue  Française  de  Civilisation  Britannique [Online],  XX-3  |  2015,  Online  since  01
December 2015,  connection on 02 March 2020.  URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/515;
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.515 
35. Kevin Rawlinson, ‘Russia involved in leak of papers saying NHS is for sale, says Reddit’, The
Guardian,  7  December  2019  https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/07/russia-
involved-in-leak-of-papers-saying-nhs-is-for-sale-says-reddit#_=_ consulted 2 March 2020. 
36. Rowena Mason, ‘Trump says Johnson's Brexit could rule out US trade deal’, The Guardian, 1
November  2019  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/31/trump-says-johnson-and-
farage-could-form-unstoppable-force consulted 2 March 2020.
37. Alma-Pierre, Bonnet, “Coming out of the fridge”, International conference, IEP Lyon 24 April
2020.
38. Emma Bell, « The 2017 Labour General Election Campaign: Ushering in a ‘New Politics’? »,
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018, Online since 14 September 2018,
connection  on  02  March  2020.  URL:  http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/2029;  DOI:  https://
doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.2029 
39. Jim Waterson, ‘Tories hire Facebook propaganda pair to run online election campaign’, The
Guardian,  23  October  2019 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/23/tories-hire-
facebook-propaganda-pair-to-run-online-election-campaign consulted 2 March 2020.
40. Ibid, Newstatesman, 4 December 2019.
41. Rosalynd,  Southern,  Election  analysis http://www.electionanalysis.uk/uk-election-
analysis-2019/section-6-the-digital-campaign/big-chickens-dumbfakes-squirrel-killers-
was-2019-the-election-where-shitposing-went-mainstream/ consulted 2 March 2020.
42. Ibid, Newstatesman, 4 December 2019
43. Ibid, The Guardian, 23 October 2019 
44. ‘Press  hostility  to  Labour  reaches  new  levels  in  2019  election  campaign’  Loughborough
University,  https://www.lboro.ac.uk/news-events/news/2019/december/press-hostility-to-
labour-reaches-new-levels/ Consulted 3 March 2020.
45. Jim Waterson, ‘Tories pretend to be factchecking service during leaders' debate’, The
Guardian,  19 November 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/19/tories-tweet-
anti-labour-posts-under-factcheckuk-brand consulted 3 March 2020.
46. Simon  Murphy,  Tories  set  up  'Labour  manifesto'  website  to  attack  Corbyn's  plans’,  The
Guardian,  21  November  2019  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/21/tory-party-
tweets-link-to-fake-labour-manifesto-site consulted 3 March 2020.
47. Simon Chandler, ‘Thousands Of Misleading Facebook Ads Help Conservatives To ‘Crushing’
U.K. Election Victory’, Forbes, 14 December 2019 https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/
2019/12/14/thousands-of-misleading-facebook-ads-help-conservatives-to-crushing-uk-election-
victory/ consulted 3 March 2020.
As Easy as Bojo’s ‘Oven-ready’ Brexit Pie? The Conservative Campaign
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-3 | 2020
13
48. The Conversation, ‘UK election 2019: conspiracy or cock-up? The digital dirty tricks marring
this campaign’ 28 November 2019 https://theconversation.com/uk-election-2019-conspiracy-or-
cock-up-the-digital-dirty-tricks-marring-this-campaign-127847 consulted 3 March 2020.
ABSTRACTS
Just two years after a disastrous campaign which cost Theresa May her majority in Parliament
and annihilated her hope of delivering Brexit, the Conservative Party managed to turn things
around and secure a landslide victory. However surprising the result might have been, many
factors can actually be used to explain this political success: a weak and disorganized opposition
that failed to provide any clear solutions to the political gridlock, a general feeling of Brexit
weariness  and,  of  course,  an  efficient  Conservative  campaign.  This  paper  will  analyse  the
Conservative campaign to understand how the Tories managed to easily win an election that was
considered by many as extremely important and whose result was almost impossible to predict.
First, we will deal with the official slogan of the Conservative campaign: “Get Brexit Done”. We
will then see that everything was organized around this simple message: making the most of the
popularity of a highly unstable candidate, Boris Johnson, and using any means possible online to
drive the point home.
Seulement deux ans après une campagne désastreuse qui a couté à Theresa May sa majorité
parlementaire et détruit ses chances de mener à bien le Brexit, le Parti conservateur a réussi à
retourner la situation et a obtenu un raz-de-marée électoral. Bien que surprenant, ce succès peut
être expliqué : une opposition faible et désorganisée qui n’a pas su trouver de solution à l’impasse
politique, un sentiment de lassitude envers le Brexit et bien sûr une campagne conservatrice qui
a fait mouche. Cet article analyse la campagne conservatrice de 2019 pour comprendre comment
les Tories ont réussi à remporter une élection qui était vue par beaucoup comme capitale mais
aussi impossible à prédire. Dans un premier temps nous traiterons du slogan officiel « Get Brexit
Done ». Nous verrons alors que toute la campagne s’articulait autour de ce message très simple :
il fallait capitaliser sur la popularité de Boris Johnson, tout en contrôlant son côté imprévisible,
et utiliser tous les moyens possibles pour faire passer le message sur le Brexit.
INDEX
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